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1.  The issue 
 
This paper discusses some of the structural and procedural 
innovations that the Security Council introduced in the Statute of the In-
ternational Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (Mechanism)1 
and reflects on how some of these developments impact on the exercise 
of the Mechanism’s judicial function. These innovations constitute a 
 
* Adjunct Professor of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law at 
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1 UNSC Res 1966 (22 December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1966, para 1. The text of the 
Statute of the Mechanism is contained in Annex 1 of Resolution 1966 (Statute). As 
indicated in the Preamble of Resolution 1966 (2010), the establishment of the Mechanism 
was necessary ‘to combat impunity for those responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law’ and to ensure that ‘all persons indicted by the ICTY and 
ICTR are brought to justice’. The Mechanism is tasked, inter alia, with completing the 
judicial work left over by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), which is set for closure by 31 December 2017, and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which was closed on 31 December 2015 (together the ‘ad 
hoc Tribunals’). Art 2 (para 1) of the Statute vests the Mechanism with the power to 
prosecute ‘the persons indicated by the ICTY or the ICTR who are among the most senior 
leaders suspected of being most responsible for the crimes covered by paragraph 1 of this 
Article [crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR]’. The Mechanism also 
has the jurisdiction to try ‘any person who knowingly or wilfully interferes or has 
interfered with the administration of justice by the Mechanism or the Tribunals and to 
hold such persons in contempt’ and ‘a witness who knowingly and wilfully gives or has 
given false testimony’. Other tasks of the Mechanism include: the referral of cases of less 
gravity to national jurisdictions (art 6); the review of indictments (art 17); the protection 
of victims and witnesses (art 20); the examination of requests for review of judgments (art 
24); the pardon or commutation of sentences (art 26); and the management of archives, 
including preservation and access of the archives of the ICTY and the ICTR (art 27). 
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unicum in the field of international criminal justice. At a micro-level, they 
bring about a shift in the modalities through which the judges of the 
Mechanism shall exercise the judicial function in respect of their col-
leagues at the ad hoc Tribunals. At a macro-level, they provide an oppor-
tunity to reflect on the kind of judicial institutions that should be devised 
in future in order to combat impunity in a fair and efficient manner.2  
Despite the name assigned to it, the Mechanism is – in essence and 
scope – a new international criminal tribunal.3 The judges and personnel 
of the Mechanism are internationally recruited and several important 
cases ‘inherited’ from the ad hoc Tribunals are currently on its docket.4 
As with any judicial institution, the Mechanism is bound to respect the 
human rights of the accused. 5 A key question that therefore arises is 
whether this new institution can exercise its judicial function whilst fully 
respecting the human rights of the accused, combining fairness with effi-
ciency. A related question is whether the Mechanism shall be able to de-
liver a degree of justice in terms of procedural and substantive fairness 
that is comparable, or at least not inferior, to that the accused would have 
 
2 Unlike what happened at the ad hoc Tribunals, the accused before the Mechanism 
have not, as yet, directly challenged the jurisdiction of the Mechanism to try them. This 
may be taken as a validation of the innovations introduced by the Security Council, which 
could make the present inquiry somewhat less relevant. However, as the reasons for this 
absence of jurisdictional challenges are not known, it is better to be cautious and not to 
infer validation from silence, and still to examine the proposed topic in some detail. 
3 On the nature of the Mechanism as an international tribunal, see the debate on the 
blog of the European Journal of International Law (EJIL: Talk!) with comments from 
Carsten Stahn, Dapo Akande and (in particular) Roger O’Keefe at <www.ejiltalk.org/ 
tribunals-are-dead-long-live-tribunals-mict-the-kosovo-specialist-chambers-and-the-turn-to-
new-hybridity/>. 
4 Currently, there are three former ICTY cases pending before the Mechanism: the 
appeals of Radovan Karadžić and Vojislav Šešelj, and the trial of Jovica Stanišić and 
Franko Simatović. There is no ICTR case pending before the Mechanism. Three ICTR 
fugitives are expected to be tried by the Mechanism when apprehended. The ICTY is 
currently completing the trial of Ratko Mladić. This means that in 2018, the Mechanism 
shall have the cases of five ICTY accused on its docket: two at the trial level and three at 
the appeals level. See <www.unmict.org/en/cases#ongoing-cases>.  
5 See in this regard F Pocar, ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice Twenty 
Years Later’ in P Acconci, D Donat Cattin, A Marchesi, G Palmisano, V Santori (eds), 
International Law and the Protection of Humanity Essays in Honor of Flavia Lattanzi 
(Brill/Nijhoff 2016) 488, 492. 
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received if prosecuted before the ad hoc Tribunals. A disparity of treat-
ment penalizing the accused before the Mechanism would be hard to jus-
tify from a legal and a moral perspective.  
The President of the Mechanism, Theodor Meron, appears confident 
in the ability of the Mechanism to ensure both efficiency and fairness. In 
recent remarks, he stated that the structure of the Mechanism and the 
various measures decided by the Security Council will make possible ‘a 
significant reduction in judicial expenses as compared with the two 
Tribunals’ and, notably, that the Mechanism shall ‘stand as a new model 
of international court: one that is leaner and more efficient, while 
continuing to meet the highest international standards of due process’.6 
In a scholarly article, Gabrielle McIntyre, Chef de Cabinet to the 
President of the Mechanism, suggests that the Security Council has pro-
vided the Mechanism with sufficient tools to ensure that its proceedings 
are conducted in accordance with those of the Tribunals, and that the 
responsibility of ensuring the highest standards of international due pro-
cess and fairness shall ultimately fall on the judges of the Mechanism.7  
Without disregarding the possibility that the Mechanism’s judges 
might in fact succeed in ensuring a full degree of fairness, this paper takes 
a more critical view. It recommends caution before heralding what is es-
sentially a remedial measure as a model for international penal jurisdic-
tions. It argues that, unless appropriate remedies are devised, the struc-
tural constraints on the Mechanism’s judges might curtail the ability of 
the judges—or at least the public perception of such an ability—to dis-
charge the judicial function to the best of their ability and deliver ade-
quately reasoned judgments. 
 
6 President Press Release The Hague (20 September 2016) <www.unmict.org/ 
en/news/president-meron-discusses-mict-new-model-international-justice>. See also 
‘Third annual report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals’ 
(31 July 2015) UN Doc S/2015/586, para 75, which provides: ‘The Mechanism’s progress 
in completing its judicial and other work swiftly while maintaining the highest of stand-
ards underscores its commitment to the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council 
and to serving as a model for international criminal justice institutions. As the Mechanism 
increasingly assumes responsibility for all aspects of the two Tribunals’ work, it will con-
tinue to focus on completing its mandate in a lean and efficient manner’ (emphasis 
added). 
7 G McIntyre, ‘The International Residual Mechanism and the Legacy of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ (2011) 3 
Goettingen J Intl L 923, 983. 
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2.  From the Completion Strategy to the Mechanism 
 
Devised by the then President of the ICTY, Judge Claude Jorda, the 
so-called Completion Strategy rested on the correct perception that the 
ICTY could not (and should not) itself try all the cases resulting from 
events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia after 1991.8  It was there-
fore necessary to divide the work between international and national ju-
dicial systems.9  The Security Council officially embraced the Completion 
Strategy in Resolution 1503 (2003) and made it its own.10 Resolution 1503 
(2003) required the ICTY to concentrate ‘on the prosecution and trial of 
the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes 
within the ICTY’s jurisdiction’ and transfer ‘cases involving those who 
may not bear this level of responsibility to competent national jurisdic-
tions’.11 In the same Resolution, the Security Council adhered to the 
ICTY’s proposed timeline, which envisaged the completion of ‘the inves-
tigations by the end of 2004, all trial activities at first instance by the end 
of 2008, and all of its work in 2010’.12 The Security Council endorsed the 
establishment of a War Crimes Chamber within the State Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to which ‘lower- or intermediate-rank accused’ should 
be referred.13 And urged the ICTR to devise its own ‘detailed strategy, 
modelled on the ICTY Completion Strategy’.14 
 A few months later, in Resolution 1534 (2004), the Security Council 
emphasized ‘the importance of fully implementing the Completion Strat-
egies’15 and, to this end, called on the ad hoc Tribunals to take ‘all possible 
 
8 See Judge Claude Jorda, ‘Address to the United Nations Security Council’ ICTY 
Press Release JDH/PIS/690-e (23 July 2002) 1. For commentary and criticism see, in 
particular,  DA Mundis, ‘The Judicial Effects of the ‘the Completion Strategies’ on the ad 
hoc International Criminal Tribunals’ (2005) 99 AJIL 142, 143-9 and TW Pittman, ‘The 
Road to the Establishment of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals’ (2011) 9 J Intl Criminal Justice 797, 799-804. 
9 ibid. 
10 UNSC Res 1503 (28 August 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1503, Preamble. See also 
UNSC Presidential Statement (23 July 2002) UN Doc S/PRST/2002/21, at 1, showing 
support early support for the Completion Strategy. 
11 UNSC Res 1503 (n 10) Preamble. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid, Preamble. 
15 UNSC Res 1534 (26 March 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1534, para 3. 
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measures’ and ‘to plan and act accordingly’.16  However, despite plans 
for closure, the caseload of the ICTY and ICTR increased over the years, 
so the Completion Strategy could not be completed. The Security Coun-
cil acknowledged as much in 2008 in a Presidential Statement voicing its 
‘concern’ at the fact that ‘the Tribunals have indicated that their work 
[was] not likely to end in 2010’.17  Stressing that ‘all persons indicted by 
the ICTY and ICTR’ should nonetheless be ‘brought to justice’,18 the Se-
curity Council accepted the recommendation of the Informal Working 
Group on International Tribunals to ‘establish an ad hoc mechanism to 
carry out a number of essential functions of the Tribunals, including the 
trial of high-level fugitives, after the closure of the Tribunals.’19 In Reso-
lution 1966, the Security Council indicated that because of ‘the substan-
tially reduced nature of these residual functions’, the Mechanism ‘was to 
be a small, temporary and efficient structure, whose functions and size 
will diminish over time’20 with only ‘a small number of staff commensu-
rate with [its] reduced functions’.21 Unlike at the ad hoc Tribunals, Article 
8(3) of the Statute of the Mechanism makes clear that, apart from the 
President, judges are to work remotely insofar as possible unless the 
President determines otherwise.22 This Article is worth being cited in full: 
 
‘The judges of the Mechanism shall only be present at the seats of the 
branches of the Mechanism as necessary at the request of the President 
to exercise the functions requiring their presence. In so far as possible, 
and as decided by the President, the functions may be exercised remotely, 
away from the seats of the branches of the Mechanism.’23   
 
 
16 ibid. In the Preamble, the Security Council noted with concern ‘indications in the 
presentations made [before the Council by the ICTY and ICTR Presidents on 9 October 
2003] that it might not be possible to implement the Completion Strategies set out in 
Resolution 1503 (2003)’. 
17 UNSC Presidential Statement (19 December 2008) UN Doc S/PRST/2008/46, at 1. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid, at 2. 
20 ibid. 
21 UNSC Res 1966 (n 1) Preamble. 
22 UNSC Res 1966 (n 1) art 8(2). See also ‘First Annual Report of the International 
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals’ (2 August 2013) UN Doc S/2013/464, para 
16. 
23 UNSC Res 1966 (n 1) art 8(3) (emphasis added). 
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This Article makes clear that, apart from the President, judges of the 
Mechanism do not work full time. Like the judges ad hoc of the 
International Court of Justice, they shall be paid only for ‘each day on 
which they exercise their functions for the Mechanism’24 in accordance 
with the ‘President’s indication of time reasonably necessary for the as-
signment’.25 
What these developments suggest is that the Mechanism is a sui gen-
eris institution created to remedy the failed grand design that was the 
Completion Strategy. The Mechanism was the means of closing down 
both Tribunals before the conclusion of their mandates, while simultane-
ously ensuring the completion of their respective mandates and the trial 
of those at large. Because of the latter reason, the Mechanism was also 
conceived as an ‘institution in waiting’. The structure of the Mechanism 
had to be ‘light’ because it would have far fewer cases than the ad hoc 
Tribunals; because of the uncertainty as to whether and when high-level 
indictees might be captured; and the possibility that its work would 
gradually reduce over time. The denomination ‘Residual Mechanism for 
International Criminal Tribunals’ signalled the break from the two ad hoc 
Tribunals, thus marking the end of their tenure in no uncertain terms. It 
certainly did not end their mandate, however, which is now for the Mech-
anism to accomplish.  
 
 
3. The Security Council’s and Mechanism’s quest for efficiency and effec-
tiveness 
 
More than seven years after the Mechanism’s conception and estab-
lishment, the climate is such that international justice is, to an extent, in 
retreat and under criticism for its considerable costs. Accordingly, the 
context in which the Mechanism is to carry out its mandate has been 
somewhat muted, as have the expectations towards it. The Mechanism is 
increasingly depicted as an innovative, cost-saving measure that could 
 
24 ibid. 
25 The judges of the Mechanism receive remuneration in accordance with the Statute 
and as set forth in the internal Guidelines on Remuneration and Entitlements for Judges 
of the Mechanism (revised, June 2015).   
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pave the way to more efficient international justice. Under the supervi-
sion of the Security Council and the leadership of President Meron, the 
Mechanism is unwaveringly committed to finding ways to minimize ex-
penses, cut costs, and increase efficiency and effectiveness. This effort is 
palpable, inter alia, in Reports issued by the Mechanism and in the prac-
tice of the Security Council. 
 In the November 2015 Progress Report to the Security Council,26 the 
Mechanism made projections for the completion of key ICTY cases27 and 
confirmed them in subsequent reports.28 The Progress Report calculated 
the length of the appeal process, assessing that: (i) the ‘Karadžić case will 
take approximately three years to complete from the issuance of the trial 
judgement to the issuance of the appeal judgement’;29 (ii) the ‘Šešelj case 
is also estimated at three years, which takes into account a one-year pe-
riod for the translation of the trial judgement into Bosnian/Croatian/Ser-
bian’;30 and (iii) that the Mladić case will take ‘two and a half to three 
years from the issuance of the trial judgement to the issuance of the ap-
peal judgement.’31  
According to the November 2015 Progress Report, ‘approximately 
two thirds of the projected time for completion will be required for brief-
ing and preparation of the case for the appeals hearing’.32 The Report 
made clear that, in this pre-appeal phase, ‘only the presiding judge, who 
is normally the President and who also acts as the pre-appeal judge’ will 
 
26 ‘Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the 
progress of its work in the initial period’ (20 November 2015) UN Doc S/2015/896 
(November 2015 Progress Report) para 15. 
27 ibid. 
28 See ‘Assessment and progress report of the President of the International Residual 
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunal, Judge Theodor Meron, for the period from 16 No-
vember 2015 to 15 May 2016’ (17 May 2016) UN Doc S/2016/453, para 37; ‘Assessment 
and progress report of the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Crimi-
nal Tribunal, Judge Theodor Meron, for the period from 16 May to 15 November 2016’ 
(17 November 2016) UN Doc S/2016/975, para 42; ‘Assessment and Progress Report of 
the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Judge 
Theodor Meron, for the period from 16 November 2016 to 15 May 2017’ (17 May 2017) 
UN Doc S/2017/434, para 41. 
29 November 2015 Progress Report (n 26) para 15. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid para 16. 
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be required at one of the seats of the Mechanism’s branch.33 The ‘other 
judges on the bench would be expected to work remotely’ and shall be 
called to the seat of the Mechanism only when the case is ready for the 
judges to ‘hear the parties and conduct deliberations.’34  Judges, the Re-
port stressed, would ‘only be remunerated for each day on which they 
exercise their functions’35 in accordance with ‘the President’s indication 
of time reasonably necessary for the assignment.’36 While acknowledging 
that ‘it is difficult to provide greater detail with regard to these estimates’, 
the Report drew a comparison with the ad hoc Tribunals:   
 
‘Nevertheless, for comparison purposes, it is estimated that a month of 
pre-appeal activity and a month of appeal activity at the Mechanism 
would produce savings in judicial expenses of close to one half as com-
pared to the expenses incurred for the same judicial activity at the two 
Tribunals.’37  
 
This comparison is illuminating. It reveals the concern of the Mech-
anism for reducing expenses and the pride of the Mechanism in being 
able to do just that. The Security Council responded to the Progress Re-
port by expressing full support38 and praising the ‘light’ structure of the 
Mechanism. It underlined, inter alia, the implementation by the Mecha-
nism of the policies of: ‘double-hatting of personnel [staff working for 
both the Mechanism and one of the ad hoc Tribunals]’;39 the ‘use of ros-
ters to ensure judges and staff are utilized only when required’;40 ‘ena-
bling judges and staff to work remotely to the maximum extent possible’; 
and ‘minimizing the need for full bench participation in pre-trial and pre-
appeal work’.41  In view of all this, the Security Council praised the Mech-
 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. The judges of the Mechanism receive remuneration in accordance with the 
Statute and as set forth in the internal Guidelines on Remuneration and Entitlements for 
Judges of the Mechanism (revised, June 2015), which is a non-public document.   
37 November 2015 Progress Report (n 26) para 16; November 2016 Progress Report 
UN Doc S/2016/975 (n 28) para 37. 
38 UNSC Res 2256 (22 December 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2256, Preamble. 
39 ibid para. 18. 
40 ibid. 
41 ibid. 
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anism for its efforts ‘to produce substantial reductions in the costs of ju-
dicial activities compared to those of the ICTY and ICTR’.42 The Council 
also called for a ‘further reduction of costs, including through, but not 
limited to, flexible staff engagement’43  and for the Mechanism to con-
tinue to take steps ‘to further enhance efficiency and effective and trans-
parent management’.44 Moreover, the Security Council requested that the 
Mechanism ‘include in its six-monthly report to the Council information 
on progress achieved in implementing this resolution, as well as detailed 
information on the staffing of the Mechanism, respective workload and 
related costs’.45 In the same ‘managerial’ spirit, the Security Council rec-
ommended that the Mechanism implement the recommendations made 
by the Council’s Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, 
and ‘continue to take steps … to further enhance efficiency and effective 
and transparent management’.46 It asked for more focused projections of 
completion timelines and the ‘implementation of a human resources pol-
icy consistent with its temporary mandate; and further reduction of costs, 
including through, but not limited to, flexible staff engagement’.47  
In August 2016, the Mechanism issued its fourth annual report in 
which it spoke of its ‘progress in completing its judicial and other work 
swiftly, while maintaining the highest of standards’ and underscored the 
commitment of the Mechanism to serve ‘as an efficient and effective model 
for international criminal justice institutions’ dedicated to carrying out ‘its 
mandate in a timely, lean and efficient manner.’48 Subsequently, in the 
November 2016 Progress Report, the Mechanism reiterated its focus on 
‘crafting innovative approaches across the institution to do so flexibly 
and effectively’ and in carrying out ‘its mandate in an efficient and cost 
effective manner’,49 although in this Report it did not make reference to 
the ‘highest standards’ of fairness as it had previously done.50   
 
 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid para.19. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid para. 20. 
46 ibid para. 19. 
47 ibid. 
48 ‘Fourth Annual Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals’ (1 August 2016) UN Doc S/2016/669, para 86 (emphasis added). 
49 November 2016 Progress Report UN Doc S/2016/975 (n 28) para 105. 
50 ibid. 
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4.  The Mechanism’s duty to provide adequately reasoned judgments 
 
What the joint and sustained effort of the Mechanism and the Secu-
rity Council to maximise ‘effectiveness and efficiency’51 seems to boil 
down to is a reduction in the costs of salaries and facilities assigned to the 
judges of the Mechanism, and in the number of personnel working on a 
case. Judges shall be paid only on the basis of the time effectively spent 
on working on a specific case. In working remotely, away from the seat 
of the Mechanism, judges will no longer benefit from an office space, 
library and easy access to the trial record of a case. Moreover, there is no 
indication that the judges of the Mechanism, unlike their colleagues at 
the ad hoc Tribunals, will have a legal assistant (normally an associate le-
gal officer at the P-2 level or, in some cases, a legal officer at the P-3 level), 
or a secretary (normally a UN staff member at the G-5 level), nor one or 
more interns.52 As noted above, the question that arises is to what extent 
these innovations have an impact on the exercise of the judicial function 
at the Mechanism. 
 
4.1.    Does the Mechanism’s structure undermine collegiality? 
 
As imposing structural constraints on how the judicial function will be 
exercised and simultaneously limiting the resources available for the 
judges, this paper argues that the innovations described in the previous 
sections have the potential – unless appropriate measures are taken – to 
hamper collegiality in the making of judgments at the Mechanism. Re-
duced collegiality is likely to affect the quality and thoroughness of the rea-
soning of these judgments, which would have an impact on the authority 
of the Mechanism as a judicial institution. This claim needs step-by-step 
articulation, beginning with a clarification of the notion of collegiality. 
As lucidly put by John Edwards, a judge who presided for several 
years over the D.C. Court of Appeals (Washington), collegiality is the 
 
51 May 2016 Progress Report UN Doc S/2016/453 (n 28) para. 6. 
52 At the time of writing, these reforms have not been fully implemented. Several 
judges of the Mechanism who are also ICTY judges are not yet working remotely from 
the seat of the Mechanism due to the continuation of their cases at the ICTY. Nonethe-
less, considering the imminent closure of the ICTY and that the ICTR has already been 
closed, it is not too early to reflect on the consequences of these changes from the practice 
of the ad hoc Tribunals. 
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realization that judges have a common interest in getting the facts and the 
law right and that, therefore, they are willing to engage in the process of 
listening to each other, persuading each other and being persuaded by 
each other.53 Collegiality requires that all judges, regardless of their specific 
individual opinions, are expected to contribute to a judgment and be 
responsible for it.54 Collegiality serves the purposes of ensuring that the 
outcome of a case is not preordained and that the submissions of the 
parties are taken seriously; in a collegial body, all points of view are, in fact, 
to be aired and considered.55 In the case of international tribunals, 
collegiality is instrumental to ensure that judges leave their comfort zone. 
This is because it is plausibly difficult for a judge who has been working all 
his or her life in a given legal system to work in a different legal framework 
with colleagues from different backgrounds.56 The importance of 
collegiality has also been stressed in the Code of Conduct for the judges of 
the Mechanism. 57 In the Preamble, the judges expressly recognize that they 
are ‘members of a collegial body, with each judge pursuing the same ob-
jective of ensuring the achievement of international criminal justice’.58 
Where the Mechanism’s set up lends itself to potential weakness vis-
à-vis collegiality is the circumstance that judges might have too limited an 
opportunity to discuss the factual and legal issues of a case in person. 
This is a problem that concerns primarily the proceedings before the Ap-
peals Chamber of the Mechanism. As for the judges of the Mechanism 
sitting on a trial, their presence is clearly required during the trial pro-
ceedings in order to hear the case.59 However, it is not clear whether these 
judges will physically remain at the Mechanism to write the judgments 
after the trial is concluded. If they will not, the following considerations, 
 
53 HT Edwards, ‘The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making’ (2003) 151 
U Pennsylvania L Rev 1639, 1644-46. 
54  R Jennings ‘The Collegiate Responsibility and Authority of the International Court 
of Justice’ in R Jennings (ed), Collected Writings of Sir Robert Jennings vol 1 (Kluwer 
1998) 343, 345.  
55 ibid. 
56 Y McDermott, ‘Strengthening the Evaluation of Evidence in International 
Criminal Trials’ (2017) 17 Intl Criminal L Rev 1, 16. 
57 Code of Professional Conduct for the Judges of the Mechanism (MICT/14) (11 
May 2015) Preamble. 
58 ibid. 
59 The re-trial of Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović case opened before a Trial 
Chamber of the Mechanism on 13 June 2017. See the Case Information Sheet at 
<www.unmict.org/en/cases/mict-15-96>. 
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although written with the forthcoming appeal cases in mind, may also be 
relevant for cases at the trial stage when the issue will arise.  
The preparation of a written judgment may well begin just after the 
appeal briefs have been filed. However, it is only after hearing the parties’ 
arguments that the content of a judgment can take shape and become 
final. The practice of the ad hoc Tribunals indicates that the period from 
the hearing of a case to the delivery of the judgment may range, on aver-
age, between four and seven months.60 Evidently, considering its length, 
it is in this broad period of time, that the reasoning supporting a judg-
ment of the Appeals Chamber is clarified, shaped and fine-tuned. Inevi-
tably, this process may involve not only a main meeting among the judges 
in which deliberations on the key issues of the case are decided, but also 
a continuous series of negotiations and sub-determinations until the judg-
ment is rendered and agreement on its content is reached unanimously 
or by majority. The importance of what happens in the temporal frame-
work that goes from the hearing of the case to the delivery of the judg-
ment can therefore hardly be underestimated. 
While it is clear that the judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Mech-
anism will be present at the seat of the Mechanism during the appeal 
hearing and the ensuing deliberations,61  it is not clear from public docu-
mentation whether they will remain at the seat of the Mechanism until 
the period of finalising the judgment. Looking at the wording of Article 
 
60 A few examples from the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chamber judgments can be 
recalled here. The period from the hearing of the appeal to the delivery of the judgment 
took before the ICTY, for example: (i) more than six months (hearing on 16 December 
2015) in Prosecutor v Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin IT-08-91-A (30 June 2016) para 
16; (ii) almost six months (hearing on 12 November 2014) in Prosecutor v Zdravko Tolimir 
(Appeal Judgment) IT-05-88/2-A (8 April 2015) para 649; (iii) more than seven months 
(hearing on 13 May 2013) in Prosecutor v Vladimir Đorđević IT-05-87/1-A (29 January 
2014) para 11; (iv) six months (hearing on 14 May 2012) in Prosecutor v Anto Gotovina 
IT-06-90-A (16 November 2012) para 8; and (iv) four months (hearing on 29 August 
2006) in Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić IT-98-29-A (30 November 2006) para 24. As con-
cerns the ICTR, the period from the hearing of the appeal to the delivery of the judgment 
took, for example: (i) more than a year (hearing from 7 to 10 May 2013) in Augustin 
Bizimungu v The Prosecutor ICTR-00-56B-A (30 June 2014) para 7; (ii) five months (hear-
ing on 7 May 2012) Jean-Baptiste Gatete v The Prosecutor ICTR-00-61-A (9 October 2012) 
para 288; and (iii) six months (hearing on 28 March 2011) in The Prosecutor v Yussuf 
Munyakazi ICTR-97-36A-A (28 September 2011) para 4. 
61 November 2015 Progress Report (n 26) para 16. 
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8 of the Statute of the Mechanism,62  it might be presumed that they will 
not, as the preference is for judges to work remotely. Perhaps it could be 
argued that there is no need for the presence of the judges in the men-
tioned period because they may submit written memoranda in response 
to draft judgments and communicate with their colleagues through a va-
riety of electronic channels. This approach may indeed be fitting with the 
Statute of the Mechanism and bring about considerable economic sav-
ings even though it is not a given that it would be faster than the approach 
at the ad hoc Tribunals, whereby judges did not work remotely.  
The overall problem with the approach that may be used at the Mech-
anism, however, is that it would discard a higher consideration of the 
judicial function that sees in protracted and genuine collegiality the (only) 
way in which high-level judgments can be construed over several months. 
Judges working collegially should also be able to form their views 
through oral communication in person. This should be to the extent per-
ceived necessary to better understand each other’s position and consider 
one another’s ideas and convictions. It would take place over a protracted 
period of time in a dialectical framework that requires dialogue, and mo-
ments of aggregation to encourage and facilitate genuine and construc-
tive dialogue. E-mailing or other forms of electronic communication may 
not be suited to discussing complicated factual and legal issues, such as 
those surrounding matters of evidence, which require looking at the rel-
evant documents.  
Presence at the seat of the Mechanism during the process of finalizing 
a judgment also presents the opportunity to have better informed judges. 
They could have access to facilities not available in their home country, and 
discuss issues with a legal assistant or members of the drafting team who 
may know the case in question well, having worked on it since its very be-
ginning.  Likewise, the circumstance that judges shall be paid only for the 
time worked on a case on the basis of the President’s determinations of the 
‘the amount of time reasonably necessary for a given assignment’ may 
undermine collegiality and the judges’ preparation. It is very difficult to 
determine in a fair manner how much time is necessary for a given 
assignment and it could become a contentious issue. To ensure high-
quality judgments, the remunerated time should factor in the time a judge 
may spend discussing the case with colleagues and legal officers, 
 
62 See relevant text in Section 2 above. 
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familiarizing with the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals, reading lengthy trial 
judgments, studying the facts of the case, and keeping abreast with relevant 
developments in the doctrine. All of these efforts could require weeks, if 
not months, of work.  
Collegiality could also be affected by the disparity in the quantity of 
input that the presiding judge, who sits at the Mechanism and presuma-
bly supervises the team of legal officers assigned to the preparation of the 
draft judgment, may give in respect of his colleagues. In practice, there is 
always a disparity of contributions in the working of a judicial institution 
between judges leading and judges following. Nonetheless, such a dispar-
ity would be difficult to justify from a fairness perspective if it were im-
plicitly institutionalized as a cost-saving measure. 
Certainly, it could be argued—and indeed hoped for—that committed 
judges are zealous enough to find ways to overcome the practical difficul-
ties of being physically separated from each other. They could work to-
gether in a collegial way irrespective of their locations, and such isolation 
could be an incentive to make the best out of an unusual setting. It could 
also be said that collegiality is an idea more than a reality. It belongs to the 
categories of ideals that the international judicial function should be about, 
rather than what it actually is in its everyday practice. In some chambers or 
in the course of some judicial cases, there is no collegiality; judges may en-
gage in battles of attrition. More worryingly, some judges might not wish 
to speak with colleagues and might contribute to a judgment less than the 
honour bestowed on them would require. Nevertheless, caution is neces-
sary not to make a general rule out of optimistic expectations or bad habits. 
Neither the possible zeal of the judges nor the difficulties of realising the 
ideal of collegiality in practice are justifications for institutionalizing pro-
cedures that make the possibility of collegiality more difficult and could 
legitimise differences among judges in the exercise of the judicial function.  
 
4.2.  Collegiality and the duty to provide reasons 
 
The duty to give reasons for judicial decisions is well entrenched in 
international (criminal) law.63 Article 21(1) of the Statute of the Mecha-
nism provides that ‘All judgements shall be delivered in public and shall 
 
63 See, among others, art 23(2) of the Statute and Rule 117(B) of the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence of the ICTY, art 22(2) and Rule 117(B) of the Rules and Procedure of 
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be accompanied by a reasoned opinion in writing’ and Rule 144(B) of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism makes clear that this 
duty also applies to judgments rendered by the Appeals Chamber.64  
As Hersch Lauterpacht has explained, full judicial reasoning is 
essential as it ‘renders it practicable for everyone to know and to assess 
the value of the grounds of the decisions given by an international 
tribunal.’65 It is necessary to show that the parties’ arguments have been 
heard and taken seriously, to avoid any impression of bias,66 to apply and 
develop the law in an authoritative manner,67 to legitimize the decision 
given, and, consequently, the institution rendering it.68 Within the field 
of criminal law,69 the duty to give reasons is considered an element of a 
fair trial.70  
The duty to give reasons is normally interpreted in a quantitative 
sense as an obligation to clarify the ratio decidendi of a case, that is, to 
explain the points of law and facts on which a decision is based71 and to 
do so in a clear and straightforward way.72 Even from a quantitative 
perspective, the duty to provide reasons is not interpreted as obliging 
 
the ICTR, art 82(4) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, and art 54 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
64 See MICT, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Residual Mechanism for 
International Criminal Tribunals, MICT/1/REV.2 (26 September 2016) Rule 144 
<www.unmict.org/sites/default/files/documents/160926-rules-rev2-en.pdf>. 
65 H Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court 
(Praeger 1958) 40. 
66 ibid. See also GI Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial 
Function (OUP 2014), at 100. 
67 M Kirby, ‘On the Writing of Judgments’ (1990) 64 Australian L J 689, 692. 
68 H Ascensio, ‘La motivation des decisions des jurisdictions pénales internationales’ 
in H Ruiz Fabri and JM Sorel (eds), La motivation des décisions des juridictions 
internationales (Editions Pedone 2008) 217, 214. 
69 The general duty to give reasons for decisions might be thought to apply with 
particular force to criminal trials. RA Duff ‘Law, Language and Community: Some 
Preconditions of Criminal Liability’ (1998) 18 Oxford J Legal Studies 189-206. 
70 W Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2015) 297. See also 
generally P Roberts, ‘Does Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights Re-
quire Reasoned Verdicts in Criminal Trials?’ (2011) 11 Human Rights L Rev 213. 
71 See G Cahin, ‘La motivation des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice’ in 
H Ruiz Fabri and J-M Sorel (eds), La motivation des décisions des juridictions 
internationales (Editions Pedone 2008) 9. 
72 See P Lalive, ‘On the Reasoning of International Arbitral Awards’ (2010) 1 J Intl 
Dispute Settlement 55, 64. 
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judges to give an answer to every single point made by the parties.73 
However, in the case of the Mechanism, because of its peculiarities, the 
problem with the reasoning proffered may not be one of quantity so 
much as one of quality.  
It is not suggested that the judgments of the Mechanism risk being 
insufficiently reasoned from a quantitative perspective. Quite to the con-
trary, drafting teams of well-experienced legal officers assigned to a case 
at the seat of the Mechanism, under the leadership of the presiding judge 
and written inputs from the other judges, may well be capable of produc-
ing well-reasoned judgments with formally impeccable results. What this 
methodology cannot do, it is submitted, is to produce judgments of the 
highest quality that are worthy of the legacy that the Mechanism is meant 
to preserve. Judgments of the Mechanism risk being poorly reasoned be-
cause working remotely judges may contribute less than they could (and 
should) do to shaping the content of those judgments.  
The duty to provide reasons is a collective duty of a judicial body as 
a whole. It means that each member of a judicial body is required to 
contribute to it to the best of his or her abilities. As one reflects on it, it 
appears superficial to construe such a duty in the field of criminal law as 
a mere procedural requirement of listing one reason after the other. It 
goes to the very fairness of a case in a substantive sense. The reasons are 
the data that the parties, and all those concerned look at to understand 
not only what a court thought, but whether it thought it correctly and 
fairly in light of the submissions proffered. It is from the quantity and 
quality of the reasons provided that the parties to a case can gauge the 
level of attention that a judge has paid to the case, and his or her 
commitment to responding adequately to the issues raised. Adequate, 
finely-tuned and well-articulated reasoning is a way to show that those 
who have been trusted with the task of deciding a case have made all the 
possible efforts to render judgments that, in their view, are just, balanced, 
and correct in both fact and law.  
Last but not least, the unquestionable historical relevance and com-
plexity of the cases the Mechanism will decide is to be underlined. Judi-
cial institutions do not make history, but inevitably their factual and legal 
determinations do contribute to the determination of historical facts, and 
 
73 Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac and others (Appeal Judgment) IT-96-23&IT-96-
23/1-A (12 June 2002) para 41. 
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can be used by either side to justify its own claims about what that history 
should be. This is a consideration relevant to both ICTR and ICTY cases. 
Each case the Mechanism is going to adjudicate is part – small or big – of 
a history that has affected millions of people. For instance, the Mecha-
nism will have the final word on the somewhat trite, yet fundamental 
question, which is still debated in the Balkans, of whether there was a 
genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995 and whether this was the only in-
stance of genocide in the Balkans since 1991. This will surely be a central 
issue in the appeals of Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. Answering 
persuasively and comprehensively this question and others of historical 
significance that the Mechanism will face, requires robust engagement 
from all the judges of the Mechanism and the provision of all the neces-
sary resources to make this engagement possible. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the preceding observations has been to draw atten-
tion to the policy currently being pursued by the Security Council and 
the Mechanism. This policy shows a laudable effort to increase effi-
ciency and reduce costs in the administration of international justice. 
Efficiency is an enabling device of international justice. The more effi-
cient international justice is, the more it gains the resources and support 
to be effective, and to pursue its goals adequately and fairly. However, 
the risk that the structural constraints on the Mechanism’s judges may 
hamper their ability to produce adequate work is real, as this paper has 
tried to show. Therefore, before exporting them to other contexts, it is 
necessary to test the innovations introduced by the Security Council 
against the requirements of a fair and just exercise of the judicial func-
tion.  
As the Mechanism ends the tenure of the ad hoc Tribunals but not 
their mandate, the pursuit of this mandate remains paramount and is a 
daunting task. It is about the preservation of the legacy of the ad hoc 
Tribunals as independent, authoritative and fair international courts, 
and the ability of the Mechanism to be up to the task and gain credibil-
ity among those subject to its jurisdiction. It is submitted that the pro-
vision of high-quality and well-reasoned judgments as described in this 
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paper is the most efficient and effective way through which the Mecha-
nism can preserve and foster that admirable legacy, and discharge au-
thoritatively the ‘special’ responsibility it owes (as not being a domestic 
judge but one imposed by the Security Council via a Chapter VII Res-
olution) to all the peoples concerned.  
 
  
